Ascent From the Abstract to the Concrete
A method of studying reality whose essence lies in the consecutive transition from abstract and one-sided conceptions of reality toprogressively more concrete reproductions in theoretical thought. As a structural principle, this method was first used by Hegel for theconstruction of his philosophical system as a whole and for the development of its separate, independent, and integral parts. In order toestablish a foundation for such a method of investigation, Hegel worked out a new theoretical conception of the relationship between thecategories of abstract and concrete. Expounding the principle of the ascent from the abstract to the concrete, Hegel, in his characteristicpanlogistic spirit, ontologizes it. He transforms the principle into an independent entity, having its own existence—into the self-developmentand self-realization of the World Spirit, the Absolute Idea. K. Marx, overcoming the ontologism and teleologism of the Hegelian interpretationof the principle of the ascent from the abstract to the concrete, gave it a materialist character. In Marx this principle was realized in thecourse of his analysis in Das Kapital of the bourgeois economic system. The methodological basis of Marxist analysis consisted of thesingling out of commodity as the elementary “cell” and initial abstraction on which investigation could be built. The interpretation of the ascent from the abstract to the concrete as a special method of cognition of reality as a whole rests on a specialconception of the relationship of the concrete to the abstract. The philosophical category of the concrete can be understood in two senses.In one sense, the concrete is the reality itself which is to be investigated—that which must be studied. In this instance, the concrete isperceived by the investigator through his experiences—direct emotional experience and pictorial conceptions—as an entity made up of“sense objects” and not yet broken down in theoretical analysis. The concrete (in such an interpretation) is the point of departure ofinvestigation. The directly perceived whole is broken down, and out of it individual aspects and interconnections are isolated for specialstudy. The goal is the derivation of general abstract knowledge. In comparison with such an interpretation of the concrete, the abstract isboth poorer and richer than the concrete: it is only one aspect of the cognition of the diversity of sense impressions, but it is also thepenetration into this isolated aspect and its internal principle. In another sense the category of the con-crete characterizes the degree anddepth of reflection in theoretical reasoning of reality as a system of essential inter-connections. In this interpretation the concrete is acharacteristic of knowledge. The definition of knowledge as either concrete or abstract is relative and has meaning only when contrastingtwo forms of knowledge relating to the same reality. For example, the knowledge stated in Clapeyron’s equation on the relationship betweenthe volume, pressure, and temperature of gas is abstract in relation to the knowledge expressed in van der Waals equation insofar as in thelatter the forces of attraction among molecules is taken into ac-count, whereas Clapeyron’s equation does not consider these forces. Theaim of investigation is the acquisition of progressively more concrete knowledge. The ascent from the abstract to the concrete as a methodof investigation is applicable only to the study of the whole, presented as an organic system of interconnections. The first step is to singleout the basic or original link and to investigate it by abstracting, or isolating, this link from other essential links. The subsequent study ofconnections—the concretization of the object of study—now takes place not in isolation but takes into account the results of the precedinganalysis. The specific character of the object under study determines the way in which the connections being subjected to analysis may betaken into account as well as their sequence. REFERENCES Marx, K. “K kritike politicheskoi ekonomii.” In K. Marx and F. Engels, Soch., 2nd ed., vol. 13. Marx, K. “Vvedenie” (from the economic manuscripts of 1857-58). Ibid., vol. 12. Marx, K. Kapital, vol. 1. Ibid., vol. 23. Il’enkov, E. V. Dialektika abstraktnogo i konkretnogo v “Kapitale” Marksa. Moscow, 1960. Grushin, B. A. Ocherki logiki istoricheskogo issledovaniia. Moscow, 1961. Naumenko, L. K. Monizm kak printsip dialekticheskoi logiki. Part 3. Alma-Ata, 1968. N. G. ALEKSEEV Category:Philosophy